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This article describes how theoretical developments in the elds of agency and con-
tract economics may be of great inspiration for the practical design of incentive{ and
performance{based compensation systems. Principles and stylized facts arising from
the analysis of the principal{agent framework and the economic theory of teams are
presented by means of trade-os that human resource practitioners should take into
account when tailoring compensation systems to the specic needs of a particular
organization.
1 Introduction
The issue of eectively designing incentives for managers has considerably
gained attention in the past years both within scholars of organizational
economics and among human resource practitioners.
As pointed some years ago by H olmstrom [1987],
\It is rare that economic theorists ::: become excited about the
same subject at the same time as \practitioners". It could be a
happy coincidence, but the fact is that incentive issues are
presently high on the agenda both in economic theory and in
practice".
Despite this common interest, to our view, cross{fertilization eorts between
economic theorists and the community of practitioners still remain quite
2unsatisfactory. This article draws upon the economic literature on incentive
design and describes its relevance for the problem of eectively designing and
setting incentives in real organizations. Our approach will mainly consist in
discussing aspects of practical incentives design from the viewpoint of the
contract and agency theory framework and to suggest to what extent these
organizational economics theories can bring useful insights and hints for
compensation and HR (human resource) practitioners and, more generally,
for everyone interested in the actual design of incentive compensation plans.
It is far for the aims of this article to give a complete survey of the large
body of organizational economics literature on compensation. As a matter of
fact, many interesting topics dierent from incentive provision, such as
human capital acquisition, bargaining problems, vertical integration issues,
property and control rights, incomplete contracting, although being related
to our topic will not be discussed here.1 Equally disregarded in this survey
will be those studies supporting the existence of components and drivers of
motivation dierent from economic incentives, such as empowerment, job
enrichment, and many other nonmonetary source of rewards. 2 Thus, the
article will focus on issues of managerial incentive provision and on will
suggest how HR practitioners may eectively make use of the stylized facts of
agency theory as guiding principles for the design of components and
determinants of managerial incentive pay schemes.3
1See, for instance, Hart and Moore [1989] and Grossman and Hart [1986] for fundamental
reference on control rights literature.
2A useful introduction to these topics can be found, for instance, in Leavitt [1978] and
Simon [1957]).
3This article builds largely on theoretical evidence about agency models (see, for in-
3The present article is organized as follows: Sections 2 and 2.2 introduce the
basic concepts of agency theory and Section 3 gives a collection of practical
design criteria suggested by agency theory. Finally, Section 4 suggests some
concluding remarks on the use of theoretical prescriptions for the practical
design of incentives in real organizations.
2 The theoretical framework on incentive
provision
2.1 The agency relationship
The fundamental question that inspires the literature on contract design is
the following: how can we make another person acting on our behalf and
performing the actions that we want? Clearly, this question has a neat
parallel in the eld of HR practitioners: how to design a compensation plan
so that managers would excert higher levels of eort on the job and would
pursue those activities which are in the full interest of my organization?
In terms of agency theory, whenever, for any reason, we depend on someone
else's action in order to reach some goal, an agency relationship arises.4 In
stance, Arrow [1985], Fama [1980], Grossman and Hart [1983], Hart and H olmstrom [1987],
H olmstrom and Tirole [1987], Myerson [1982], Pratt and Zeckhauser [1985], Ross [1973],
Levinthal [1988]. It is worth to mention that many insights for the design of incentives
may be found also, in the empirical [Prendergast, 1999, Lazear, 1995, 1997, Gibbons and
Waldman, 1999, Malcomson, 1999] and in the experimental literature [Rossi, 1999, G achter
and Fehr, 1999] on incentive pay.
4The convenience to delegate to someone else the fulllment of one's interest within or-
4the following we will dene as \principal" the person designing the terms of
the relationship between him and another person acting on his behalf,
dened as \agent". Typically, when an agency relationship occurs, the
principal's welfare (outcome) depends on actions and decisions directly
undertaken by the agent.
Agency relationship are pervasive in organizations (since each worker at a
given hierarchical level is both the agent of his superior and the principal of
his subordinates) and more generally in business relationships.
The problem of agency theory is to nd a way to induce the agent to act in
the interest of the principal, even when some divergence of interests is
present. There are many ways that can be employed in order to reach this
aim (for instance, brute force and coercion), but the focus of principal{agent
theory is in providing non{coercing solutions to the divergence of interests.
In other words, the theory suggests that it is possible and convenient for the
principal to provide (design) the right incentives for the agent to act in the
principal's interest.
2.2 Divergence of interests and monetary incentives
Organizations typically are made by people characterized by dierences in
aims and goals. This nding has been theorized long before the development
ganizations can be justied employing dierent explanations; among the ones, the need for
specialization and coordination of dierent tasks and the existence of information asymme-
tries about which particular patterns of action are more adequate to reach a set of goals
[Moe, 1984].
5of agency theory5 but it is within this theoretical framework that it has been
possible to formalize in an analytical way the divergence of interests within
organizations and to derive formal properties of economic incentives. The
basic idea underlying agency theory is that it is possible to set up a system of
monetary rewards contingent to actions and/or results (that are in the
interest of the principal but under the control of the agent) so to reconcile
the dierence in aims between the two parties.
Many contributions in organization and HR theory have highlighted the role
of many intrinsic devices in fostering motivation and realignment of aims
within the organization. These studies highlight in particular that it is
possible to promote corporate culture, belief in organizational goals and sense
of belonging and loyalty to the organization using motivational instruments
such as peer pressure, work ethic, pride in craftsmanship, and so on. On the
other side, the focus of agency theory is on the monetary payos as a way to
realign dierent aims. For the sake of completeness, it is also true that, more
recently, some studies within organizational economics have successfully
incorporated in the standard agency framework of reference motivational
5This claim dates back at least to contributions in the economic theory of the rm starting
from the 50s, pointing out that, due to the separation from ownership and control, rms
may be involved in the (rational) maximization of measures dierent from prots: Baumol
[1958], for instance, suggested revenue as a substitute for prots in maximization eorts
undertaken by managers, Williamson [1964] suggested managerial bonuses and discretional
expenses, Marris [1964] suggested growth rates and relative performance measures such as
market share. Also, Cyert and March [1972]' behavioral theory of the rm suggested the
existence of divergence of interests within organizations and of processes of quasi{negotiation
of organizational goals.
6devices dierent from money (in particular peer and group pressure [Barron
and Paulson Gjerde, 1997, Kandel and Lazear, 1992], reciprocal behavior,
fairness and altruism [Rotemberg, 1994]), enlarging the number of
instruments available to the organizational designer for eliciting motivation
and inuencing workers' goals.6
3 From theoretical principles to the practical
trade-os of incentive design
Since we are interested in assessing the practical use of economics{based
research on organizational incentives, we should start recognizing that
principal{agent models have studies the design of optimal compensation
contracts in highly stylized settings, settings somehow just loosely resembling
the complexity of those of real organizations. As a matter of fact, much of
the research in this eld, especially during the early years, pertains to the
analysis of optimality conditions of contracts in extremely simplied
production environments where a principal has to design the incentives to
give out to a single agent which performs a simple production task.
Nevertheless, despite these highly simplied assumptions, agency theory has
been able to give strong advice on the design of incentives in real settings
because this theory has given a framework to investigate which properties
compensation and motivational systems have to met in order to deal with the
many problems that arise within organizations, such as the inability to
6Much of this article will deal with explicit and monetary incentives, even if some refer-
ences will be made to motivational devices dierent from monetary payos.
7measure individual contributions to a group outcome, the opportunistic and
self{interest attitude of workers, the existence of dierences in disposition
towards risk and the existence, inside the principal{agent relationship, of
information asymmetries on preferences, ability and other characteristics of
the employee, and the nature of those tasks needed to fulll the
organizational goals.
The literature on the provision of incentives has clearly pointed out that
there does exist a multitude of motivational instruments { such as piece rates,
stock options, discretionary bonuses, promotions and tournament based
prizes, prot sharing, eciency wages, deferred compensation, and many
more { that can ben used to induce workers to act in the interest of their
employers and it has been able to give design advice both on advantages and
drawbacks of single incentive devices and on the global \tness" of a given
mix of incentive instruments (evaluated with respect both to corporate aims
and exogenous variables such as labor market conditions, workers skills, level
of risk, characteristics of the production technology, and so on).
As a consequence, the main nding of the theory, or perhaps the one more
useful for a practitioner in the eld of incentive design, is the recognition that
there does not exist a single contract being able to reconcile all dierent aims
that traditionally are assigned to incentive pay systems. That is, specic
contracts and instruments seem to be particularly suited to address dierent
problems of managerial motivation. As a result, agency theory strongly
points out to the incentive designer that, when setting up or revising the
managerial incentive system, it is of fundamental importance to recognize
and rank the existing problems and to concentrate on those that seem to be
8of central concern for the specic organization. Whether the primary aim of
incentives is to make individual workers perform at their best, exerting the
highest possible level of eort on the job, or it is to foster cooperation within
teams of workers; whether it is to align risk preferences of workers with those
of the organization or it is to signal and discriminate high performers and
highly skilled managers inside group of peers; the actual design of incentive
schemes will strongly depend on which of these questions it is thought to be
the most relevant [H olmstrom, 1987].
Thus, which use can be made of agency{theory from the perspective of the
practical design of incentive schemes? Recalling the arguments introduced at
the beginning of this Section, while it is important to recognize that people's
motivation is not only shaped by extrinsic monetary incentives but also by
nonmonetary incentives and rewards and by implicit attitude to adhere to
corporate goals, it is our opinion that it is possible to make use of the
ndings of contract theory to highlight many interesting stylized facts
regarding the impact on managers' behavior of the introduction of incentive
compensation systems.
Since we have suggested that the choice of the right mix of incentive
instruments is contingent to the kind of organizational problems that
incentives are supposed to solve, we will, in the following, try to give a
collection of design criteria highlighting the main tradeos that the designer
has to evaluate in the process of setting up the incentive policies of his
organization. In particular we will point out that the incentive designer has
to take into account the following tradeos:
9Risk{sharing: eciency vs. insurance. The \strengthness" of incentives
in fostering high levels of eort on the job has to be chosen in order to
balance motivational power of incentives and costs of compensation
plans;
Asymmetric information: risk shifting vs. information disclosure.
It has to be evaluated to what extent incentive schemes are intended as
vehicles for the truthful disclosure of information asymmetries, and how
to balance this aim with the goal of achieving high levels of eort from
workers;
Relative vs. absolute incentives. Relative evaluation techniques allow to
lter common noise and to treat the observed performance values as
more informative, but they also aect the attitude of managers towards
cooperation and coordination;
Long{ vs. short{term incentives. Short{term or long{term concerns can
be induced in compensation plans both introducing dierent
compensation instruments and dierent time spans in compensation
formulas. In any case the choice has to reect the time horizon that the
organization wants to promote;
Continuous vs. discrete incentives. Compensation plans can use a
combination of continuos and discrete incentives. The mix of rewarding
instruments has to be carefully chosen with respect to specic goals of
incentive plans and keeping an eye on the consequences on manager's
behavior;
10Simple vs. complex rules. Both rules that are too simple or too complex
may result in manipulations and in deceptive behavior by managers
\gaming" the incentive scheme against the interest of the organization;
Objective vs. subjective performance measures. Performance
evaluations based on objective criteria can be intertwined with those
based on subjective criteria. In highly complex environments and when
there are many source of contractual incompleteness the latter ones can
help the evaluation of performance, even if their introduction may
foster new kind of dysfunctional responses by principals and agents.
Before to concentrate on these tradeos, let us briey discuss the provision of
incentives in a perfect world, that is, as we will see, a world where
propensities towards risk of principals and agents do not dier.
3.1 The ideal payment scheme in a perfect world
A common assumption underlying agency theory is that it is impossible to
directly measure the contribution (eort) of a single agent performing a
productive task, since direct observation by the principal may be impossible
or too costly to undertake (as in the case of the individual contribution to a
team output) or the principal may even fail to recognize which tasks
performed by his agent are more close to his interest. Thus, it is generally
assumed that the principal, in evaluating the contribution of the agent to his
wealth, has to rely on imperfect and indirect measures such as the agent's
performance.
11Following Gibbons [1998], let's assume that the agent may take an
unobservable action (or eort) a to produce the output (or performance)
y = a + ". The noise term ", inside this production function, can be
interpreted either as the measurement error of the principal trying to
evaluating the agent's action using an imperfect monitoring technology, or,
alternatively, as an external randomness in the market blurring the link
between agent's action and agent's performance.7 The wage contract might
be linear as well and equal to w = s + by, where s is a xed salary and b is
the piece rate. Thus, the agent's payo is w   c(a), where c(a) is the
disutility for taking action a and the principal's payo, under the
nonrestrictive hypothesis that each produced unit is worth 1 monetary unit
in the market, is equal to y   w.
Within this extremely simplied framework it is possible to appreciate the
eectiveness of incentives in hierarchical relationships: clearly the piece rate b
has strongly consequences on the agent's motivation: the extreme case of full
incentives, when b = 1, gives the agent full title to the output y and so
enhances greatly his motivation, while also imposing on him all risk
(expressed by the variabilty of the random term "). On the other extreme,
when b = 0, the compensation plan oers to the agent full insurance but no
incentive to produce at all, since, no matter how large his eort, his payo is
xed and equal to s.
Thus, under the hypothesis of risk neutrality, it is easy to derive the optimal
7Following the former interpretation, the principal commits misjudgments in observing
the action undertaken by the agent while, according to the latter one, the principal directly
observes the agent's performance, that is only partial inuenced by the agent's action.
12conditions of the contract, that state that incentives are xed to the
maximum level b = 1 and in equilibrium the eort the agent puts on the job
is so to make marginal costs of eort equal to marginal return from eort. In
opposition to what we have just stated, we will see below that the key
hypothesis of agency theory is that the agent (manager) is risk averse rather
than risk neutral, and that this have strong implications on the shape of
compensation plan, since the principal, in providing incentives, has to
carefully evaluate a tradeo between productive eciency and cost of
compensation plan.8
3.2 Risk{sharing: eciency vs. insurance
We have just shown that, whenever the only goal of the compensation
scheme is to provide the agent with the maximum incentive to exert the
highest possible eort on the job, the principal can fully solve the agency
problem by setting the agent's marginal payment rate (for instance in terms
of piece rate) equal to 100%. The rationale for this lies in recognizing that
the agent can be made fully induced to promote the principal's interest if he
is made the residual claimant of the principal's benets. This way, the
principal \sell" to the manager the right to act as the principal and to retain
all the benets of his actions (in terms of the model introduced in the
previous subsection this means that s is negative).
Setting marginal incentive rates equal to 100% corresponds to the ideal
8More precisely the same optimality conditions still hold introducing risk{aversion, when
the agent and the principal are characterized by the same level of risk{aversion (see also
further in the next subsection).
13situation in which eciency is maximized, since in this way it is possible to
generate the largest \pie" that then can be divided between the principal and
the agent. While marginal incentive rates equal to 100% are observed in real
settings (a famous example of them are compensation schedules of New York
City cab{drivers[McMillan, 1992]), as a matter of fact piece rates are
commonly set to much lower levels.
It has been argued that the reason for that stems from the existence of equity
concerns that have to be traded o with eciency: while full incentives may
maximize the expected size of the pie to be shared, compensation plans
should avoid to shift all risks of the size of the pie to one side of the
relationship.
As a matter of fact, this claim of equity is not even necessary, because
assuming dierences in propensities towards risk between the principal and
his agent, more precisely assuming that the latter is more risk averse than
the former, it is possible to show that it is mutually benecial to both parties
not to completely shift risk from the rm (principal) to the agent.
Thus, it may simply be too costly for the principal to shift completely risk to
the agent, that is to give him the highest powered incentives, because, since a
manager is assumed to be not as ecient a risk{bearer as is the capital
market, his reward for bearing the risk may be too higher than the risk prize
of the principal, or, in other words, the manager would be willing to accept a
smaller average payment from the principal if the latter would bear some
risk, and the latter would nd this exchange protable.
Hence, the tradeo that is here discussed here is not between eciency and
14equity but, more precisely, between eciency and insurance. Incentive
designers, then, have to clearly decide how strong to set the link between
performance and pay, and, in designing contractual agreements, have to take
into account the existence of this fundamental trade-o between incentive
gain (increase in performance) and compensation costs (increase in reward
for risk bearing). The proper pay{performance link should be thus evaluated
by the designer taking into account external factors such as the attitude
towards risk of managers, general economic conditions and rm{ and
industry{specic risk levels, and the amount of risk{taking behavior that the
organization want to transfer to managers. Moreover, the decision on the
strength of incentives has to clearly take into account how much discretionary
is the behavior of the manager, that is how much performance is responsive
to change in the level of eort put out by the manager on the job.
The result is risk sharing or partial risk shifting, where, since it is mutually
benecial that the principal still bears some risk, the incentives for the agent
are reduced and the latter is made only partially accountable for the results
of his actions.
We have argued in this subsection that contracts have to be designed not
only in order to promote high levels of eort on the job, but they have as
well to take into account equity and insurance constraints on the side of the
manager.
There is one more justication for designing contracts that give to managers
less than full empowered incentives. One point that will be made clear below
is that, whenever the manager owns private information on the determinants
15of his performance, the principal may have the convenience to set the
incentives not only to promote high levels of eort but also to make the agent
reveal his private information, diminishing the magnitude of information
asymmetries between the parties involved in the contractual agreement.
3.3 Asymmetric information: risk shifting vs.
information disclosure
In many working environments it is the norm for the manager to own private
information on various elements aecting his performance on the job and
eventually his incentive payment. Typically, the principal may not be
completely aware of the manager's capabilities and skills, and of which level
of performance is reasonable to expect, given those skills and other contingent
elements, such as market conditions. As a result, the principal may nd
dicult to set incentives in the contractual agreement, and may risk to design
a contract with very low motivational strength or, conversely, to impose too
much risk on the agent. In both cases, the outcome would be inferior than
the optimal case where information is completely and freely available to the
principal. Such bad outcomes may be successfully avoided if the principal
were able to uncover the private information owned by his manager.
Agency theory ndings suggest that it is possible for the principal to induce
the agent to truthfully reveal his private information, linking the
compensation plan of the latter to information that is explicitly disclosed by
him. For instance, in the case of imperfect information on skills and
capabilities of the manager, the trick is to set up a series of incentive plans
16among which the latter is asked to choose, so that high performance agents,
and only them, are better o choosing a high performance compensation plan
and, vice versa, low performance managers, and just them, are better o
choosing a low performance plan. As a result, the compensation plan is
structured oering alternative reward packages that are meant to make
managers signal their \type" and to truthful disclose information relevant for
evaluating observed performance. Usually this kind of compensation policies
are focused on mechanisms based on two performance indicators: predicted
(ex{ante) performance (measured as forecasts elicited from managers), and
actual (ex{post) performance.
Once again, this principle of agency theory recalls the existence of a tradeo
between truthful revelation of information and eciency of the system, since
the principal has to set lower than full incentives as a way to induce the
agent to truthful reveal his private information.
It is also worth to mention what can represent a strong advantage of the
above described bottom{up method of compensation plan design over
traditionally top{down methods of targets assessment by superiors. As a
matter of fact, the introduction into managers' compensation plans of
mechanisms of self{assessments of potential performance, assure the incentive
designer that agents will voluntarily disclose to superiors all the relevant
information available. This will happen because their pay at the end of the
period will depend on information revealed at the beginning of it, during the
process of setting up targets, goals and similar variable elements of the
compensation plan. Then, while this method is undoubtfully more dicult to
implement and sustain overtime than others, it also has the unvaluable
17advantage that, if the plan is overall specied correctly, there is no space for
strategic manipulation by managers. Conversely, traditional top{down
attribution of targets and benchmarks in evaluating performance, especially
when compensation plans are revised very often, may result in deceptive
strategic behavior. If the principal cannot committ, for instance, to a
long{term contract, the agent may not want to perform at his best for fear of
raised objectives in the early future (this phenomenon, also known as
\ratchet eect", has been proved to be of relevant magnitude in job
evaluation and incentive design of both organizations [Ickes and Samuelson,
1987, Dearden et al., 1990, Gibbons, 1987] and central planned economies
[Berliner, 1976, Weitzman, 1980]).
In the previous subsection we have shown that one major issue of an agency
relationship, both from the theoretical perspective and the practical design of
incentives in organizations, is that it is possible to evaluate the contribution
of the manager to the principal's wealth only using an imperfect
measurement technology. Since the manager's eort on the job is not directly
observable, the principal has to infer the contribution of the agent from
actual performance, that is on the consequences of the agent's actions. We
have also argued that it is favorable for the principal to collect all the
possible information in order to improve the process of the managerial
performance evaluation. We have suggested that a common way to reach this
is represented by elicit the disclosure of asymmetric information that pertains
to the manager. However, other instruments are available as well. Among
them, as we will see next, indexation of contracts and subjective assessment
of performance are extensively used as a way to take into account the impact
18on performance of unforeseen events. Hence, let us turn our attention, now,
to another instrument that can be equally useful in improving the evaluation
of managerial performance: relative performance assessment.
3.4 Relative vs. absolute incentives
One of the main claims of agency theory, since the early years, has been the
recognition that the provision of incentives and their eects on managerial
behavior are constrained by randomness and errors in measuring individual
performance. The less the performance indicator represents the quality of the
action undertaken by the agent, the less the motivational power of
performance pay, since compensation is made dependent on variables that
are beyond the inuence of the agent. As a result, it has been advanced that
relative performance evaluation can be eectively used in order to lter out
common noise in the measurement of performance of managers carrying out
similar jobs or undertaking similar activities [Lazear and Rosen, 1981,
Lazear, 1995].
The drawback of relative compensation is that, since the manager is paid on
the basis of a comparison between his own performance and the performance
of peers within the organization, it may foster more competition among
groups of workers than what it could be considered as optimal and may elicit
self{interested behavioral responses, such as restraining from cooperation and
\helping on the job" eorts. This may be particularly dysfunctional for the
purposes of the organization when groups of workers are characterized by
highly interdependent tasks (as in the case of team production), or, more
19generally, when specialization of skills and knowledge asks for eorts of
managers to be coordinated.
Since compensation package are usually made by many dierent components,
the incentive designer has to carefully evaluate the tradeo between
magnitude of absolute and relative evaluations since they may aect the
degree of trust within the organization and result in attitudes towards
cooperation incompatible with the goals of the organization. Agency theory
suggest that the weight of relative compensation should be higher in working
settings characterized, on the one hand, by common factors aecting
individual performance and, on the other hand, by high levels of turnover
and organizational mobility and by strongly competitive, rather than
cooperative, dynamics among managers engaged in similar jobs.
3.5 Long{ vs. short{term incentives
Short{sightness of managers is often cited as one of the major determinants
of the conict in goals between property and control within organizations. As
a matter of fact long{ or short{term perspectives of managers can be elicited
by the incentive designer both acting at the level of performance measures
and at the level of the explicit time span considered by the compensation
plan. The former argument suggest that dierent performance measures
elicit dierent attitude towards time; for instance linking pay to market data,
when available, seems to foster long{time concerns, while accounting{based
indicators seem, at least when used alone, to induce much more short{sight
20behavior of managers.9
The advice of agency theory for the designer of incentive plans is to carefully
choose among the available measures of performance, taking into account the
tradeo between market vs. accounting indicators. While it is true that the
former are closely connected to the shareholders wealth and are more robust
and less sensitive to deceptive manipulation or extraneous and temporary
changes, it is also to be recognized that, the lower the hierarchical level the
manager belongs to, the lower the link between his actions and the overall
performance of the organization, blurring, as a consequence, the motivational
power of incentives.
Moreover, the choice of the time horizon that has to be induced to managers
has to take into account structural factors pertaining to the technology used
by the organization, the pace of return from investments and of depreciation
of capital assets, and many more.
3.6 Continuous vs. discrete incentives
Discrete incentives, rather than continuous ones, are characterized by
providing monetary or nonmonetary rewards contingent with step{level
measures of performance and/or probabilistic monitoring of performance.
Bonuses, prizes, promotions, on the one side, nes and loss of job, on the
other side, can be made part of the compensation plan and can elicit the
same behavioral response of continuous incentives.
9See below also for a discussion of deceptive activities carried on through manipulation
of accounting data.
21It has to be recognized that in this case the incentive designer is not facing a
real tradeo, since often discrete and continuous incentives are not used as
substitute but rather they can be treated as complements. In this sense,
discrete incentives reinforce the eect of continuous ones and can be
especially helpful when the motivational strength of the latter category has
to be set to low levels due to risk{sharing concerns.
In any case the designer has to clearly state the relative strength of those
components in the compensation plan to avoid that the saliency of single
elements is too diminished. This advice is strongly connected with another
crucial evaluation that has to be pondered in setting up incentive plans, that
is which level of complexity of the plan is optimal for the organization, to
which we turn now.
3.7 Simple vs. complex rules
We have argued above that there does exist a multiplicity of tradeos that
have to be taken into account in the design of incentives for managers in real
organizations. In setting up compensation plans, it is necessary to decide
how much risk is to be shared between parties involved in the organization,
how to deal with asymmetrical information, whether to use relative or
absolute, long{term or short{term, continuous or discrete incentives.
While it has been argued that some tradeos call for the designer to choose
exactly among alternative design options, on the basis of the prominent
objective that the compensation plan is meant to address and solve, in other
cases it is possible to overcome the tradeo between competing properties of
22dierent class of incentives, designing more complex compensation plans, by
composition of dierent types of incentive schemes in large rewarding rules.
In a similar way, contract theory suggests that all factors that are correlated
with performance should be included in the incentive scheme (this is the so
called Informativeness Principle [H olmstrom, 1979]), because it is thus
possible, as we have already seen, to rule out more noise in the measurement
of performance, and so to increase the motivational power of incentives on
managerial conduct.
Despite this, it is very often observed in real organizational settings that
contracts build only on a subset of the available measures of performance and
that simple rewarding rules are commonly used in compensation plans.
As a matter of fact, both contracts based on too complex and too simple
incentive rules may induce dysfunctional behavior of managers and may
introduce similar, although of dierent nature, source of manipulation by
managers. Consequently, the attention of the incentive designer is one more
time call upon the existence of a tradeo between simplicity and complexity
of the rewarding rule to implement.
First of all, let's focus on simplicity. While simple rules of reward have the
advantage of being easy to communicate, it has also been shown by contract
theory that in multi{task settings simple compensation rules may have
negative eects of managerial behavior: since contracts cannot specify all the
relevant aspects of behavior of the manager, simple incentive rules can give
rise to dysfunctional behavioral responses, where agents focus only on
activities and aspects of their task that are explicitly rewarded and disregard
23those activities that are not compensated [Milgrom and Roberts, 1988]. This
is particularly true if we consider the provision of incentives as a dynamic
process, rather than a static one. It can even be argued that the variability
of compensation policies overtime in real organizations can be explained, to
some non{negligible extent, to strategic reactions of incentive designers to
managers learning to \game" the current compensation system to their
advantage. As a matter of fact some empirical studies have addressed this
hypothesis of dysfunctional responses to incentive scheme too narrowly
dened and overall reinforce the idea that the HR unit within the
organization has to clearly rely on multiple rewarding instruments and design
balanced compensation packages if dysfunctional eects of incentives are to
be minimized.
However, also compensation plans that are too complex may lead to
dysfunctional outcomes. Clearly, the introduction of mix of dierent
compensation elements (such as continuous and discrete incentives,
long{term and short{term incentives, and so on), if the total expected cost of
compensation plan is assumed to be constant, results in a loss of absolute
motivational power of each single component. Moreover, deceptive behavior
and distortion may be due to complexity of single elements inside a
rewarding rule, such in the case of non{linearity. This is particularly true of
those rewarding rules based on accounting data. For instance, whenever
non{linearity is introduced in terms of upper or lower bound caps or
step{level functions, this may induce end{of{period manipulation of
investment decision and transfer across periods of accounting data to
maximize the monetary rewards in both periods, regardless of the impact of
24these manipulations on organizational performance.
Again, agency theory provide to the incentive designer the tools to
understand the terms of the tradeo between complexity and simplicity and
is left free to decide the position to take within the tradeo, contingent to
the aims he attaches to the compensation plan.
Finally, it has also been suggested that, in order to avoid distortions of
behavior (such as in multi-tasking), the stress on objective measures of
performance should be lessened and the organizational designer should
introduce also subjective, rather than only objective, performance evaluation.
This is the topic of our last tradeo.
3.8 Objective vs. subjective performance measures
Subjective measures of performance introduce the issue of discretionary role
of superiors in evaluating the contribution of subordinates within the
organization. The basic point in making use of these techniques is that they
may be more suitable for the evaluation of observed performance in settings
characterized by highly multidimensional tasks and by strong diculties in
setting ex{ante objective benchmarks of managerial conduct.
Nevertheless, it has to be emphasized that subjective performance evaluation
is not completely safe from manipulation and distortion and the incentive
designer has to clearly evaluate whether the benets of the introductions of
these instruments outperform their drawbacks, such as, to name a few of
them, intentional deceptive behavior of superiors, that may be inclined to
underevaluate performance in order to save on wages, non{intentional
25evaluation bias of superiors (as it happens in the case of compression of
ratings), and rent{seeking activities of agents, carrying out patterns of
behavior intentionally aimed to increase the probability of good evaluations
from principals, even when this happens in contrast to organizational goals.
4 Discussion and concluding remarks
Some nal remarks should be added on how to design and provide incentives
in real organizational settings. Specically, some addenda are to be given
regarding the selection eects of incentive plans, the relationship between
features of compensation plans and hierarchical positions and the
explanation of how organizations may pursue eciency despite the presence
of weak incentives for managers.
Regarding the selection eect it has to be noted that the choice of a specic
compensation package not only aects the motivation of current employees,
but also bears some relevant consequences in attracting on the market
specic class of workers [Lazear, 1986]. The incentive designer has then to
keep in mind both eects when designing compensation plans.
About the second remark, the tradeos introduced in the past pages should
be carefully evaluated at each level of the organization and the compensation
plan should be made contingent on the kind of position held within the
hierarchy. For instance, recalling a principle that has been highligthed above,
the use of market data measures of performance, when available, should be
especially employed at top level positions while accounting measures should
be reserved for mid{level executives and managers. Moreover, high level of
26internal job market mobility, that may result in myopic decision{making if
incentives were based only on present performance indicators, should be
contrasted introducing partial bonuses rewarding manager for their former
assignment over a future span of years. Compensation committees may be
introduced to enhance the credibility of compensation policies, especially
when it is feared that dysfunctional behaviors may be elicited by managers'
beliefs about revision and subjective manipulation of targets and benchmarks
in subjective evaluations from supervisors [H olmstrom, 1987].
Finally, it has been pointed out by critics of agency{theory that organization
often are successfully managed without relying extensively on incentives, as
on the contrary theory would suggest. As a matter of fact, many current
critics of the agency framework today are still referring to the classic and old
agency model that introduced the tradeo between incentives and insurance.
In defense of agency{theory, it should be noted that, while much of the early
years debate has been focused on the mentioned issue, it is also true that now
risk{sharing is recognized as being just one topic among many and that the
attention of theoretical analysis has recently shifted to dierent topics, such
as which institutions are more suitable to foster incentive for skill acquisition
rather than only for eort provision, which are the incentives for repeated
interactions and reputation formation, how to analyze the problem of
incentives provision in multiagent or in multilevel settings, and many more.
Moreover, we now have many explanations, within the agency framework, of
why organizations may favorably rely on weak incentives rather than strong
ones. As H olmstrom and Milgrom [1994] have clearly argued:
27\The use of low{powered incentives within the rm, although
sometimes lamented as one of the major disadvantages of internal
organization, is also an important vehicle for inspiring
cooperation and coordination" [H olmstrom and Milgrom, 1994].
In a very similar fashion, Lazear [1989] proved that, organizations are better
o in the case of weak incentives rather than in the case of strong and
dysfunctional incentives (incentives that foster managers to engage in
sabotaging activities as a means to maximize their incentive pay).
Moreover, many scholars have come to recognize that numerous sources of
managerial self{discipline and of monitoring may considerably limit
discretionary powers of managers and may act as a direct substitute of full
explicit monetary incentives. Managers subject to low{empowered incentives
may still act in the interest of the organization to the extent that monitoring
committees (such as board of directors) prove to be eective, market pressure
fosters the production of attractively priced products, the threat of a takeover
elicits preemptive behavior by managers in keeping prots high, long{term
career concerns are at work and elicit self{discipline, and so on [Kreps, 1997].
Overall, as we have tried to argue extensively through this article, the
mature framework of agency{theory appears to be a powerful tool in the
hand of those HR scholars and practitioners interested in the practical design
of incentives in organizations since it oers a comprehensive frame of
reference that can be eectively used in anticipating the eects of the
implementation of incentive compensation plans in real organizational
settings and their interactions with the intrinsic motivation of managers.
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